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Abstract
When people rapidly judge the truth of claims presented with or without related but nonprobative 
photos, the photos tend to inflate the subjective truth of those claims—a "truthiness" effect (Newman et 
al., 2012).  For example, people more often judged the claim “Macadamia nuts are in the same 
evolutionary family as peaches” to be true when the claim appeared with a photo of a bowl of 
macadamia nuts than when it appeared alone. We report several replications of that effect and three 
qualitatively new findings: (a) in a within-subjects design, when people judged claims paired with a 
mix of related, unrelated, or no photos, related photos produced truthiness but unrelated photos had no 
significant effect relative to no photos; (b) in a mixed design, when people judged claims paired with 
related (or unrelated) and no photos, related photos produced truthiness and unrelated photos produced 
“falsiness;” and (c) in a fully between design, when people judged claims paired with either related, 
unrelated, or no photos, neither truthiness nor falsiness occurred. Our results suggest that photos 
influence people’s judgments when a discrepancy arises in the expected ease of processing, and also 
support a mechanism in which—against a backdrop of an expected standard—related photos help 
people generate pseudoevidence to support claims.
Keywords: Truth judgments, photographs, cognitive fluency, truthiness
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Truthiness and Falsiness of Trivia Claims Depend on Judgmental Contexts  
 True or false: The liquid metal inside a thermometer is magnesium. If you are like the subjects in our 
studies, you will find this judgment difficult. The cognitive psychology literature suggests that you will 
try to arrive at a judgment about the claim by retrieving information from memory—related thoughts 
(“Which metals are liquid?”) and images (your high school chemistry teacher)—to help you decide 
(Graesser & Hemphill, 1991). The literature also suggests that you will probably search for information 
confirming the hypothesis that the claim is true (Gilbert, 1991; Nickerson, 1998). If your retrieved 
thoughts and images are not diagnostic for a true/false judgment, you may make a feeling-based 
judgment instead (Reber & Unkelbach, 2010; see Schwarz, 2010, for a review). A large body of work 
shows that these feeling-based judgments are influenced by beliefs, expectations, and other aspects of 
previous experience that shape processing in the moment, which in turn influence true/false judgments 
(Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; 
Mandler, 1980; Ozubko & Fugelsang, 2011; Unkelbach, 2007). 
Now suppose you evaluate the claim with the photo in the left panel of Figure 1. Would this 
photo influence your answer? It seems obvious that the photo should have no influence, since it is 
nonprobative: It does not provide any evidence about the nature of the liquid inside the thermometer. 
But recent research suggests that the photo probably would influence your answer (Newman, Garry, 
Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012). When we asked people to judge the truth of difficult claims that 
appeared with or without related nonprobative photos, photos biased people toward believing the 
claims. 
Thus related nonprobative photos can produce a “truthiness1" effect: When making rapid 
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1 From comedian Stephen Colbert, who defined truthiness as “truth that comes from the gut, not books.” Incidentally, when 
Colbert discussed our research on his show, he noted that, "Of course, everyone knows that the metal in a thermometer is 
not magnesium: One taste and you know it is made of dancing light and liquid time" (see tinyurl.com/truthiness2012).
judgments about the truth of a claim, nonprobative photos nudge people towards believing that claim 
(Newman et al., 2012). But why? If a picture of a thermometer does not tell you whether the metal 
inside is magnesium, why would it bias you to conclude the claim is true? Several lines of research fit 
with the idea that photos help people generate pseudoevidence2 about the claim, and suggest two broad 
ways photos might have this effect. 
 First, nonprobative photos might promote truthiness in an automatic, bottom-up way by 
providing rich semantic contexts for target claims. There is evidence that such contexts can boost 
conceptual processing and produce illusions of familiarity and truth (see Ozubko & Fugelsang 2011; 
Whittlesea, 1993). For example, people tend to claim that they saw a target word (“test”) earlier when 
the word appears in a semantically related sentence (“The anxious student wrote a test”) rather than in a 
more neutral sentence (“Later that afternoon she took a test;” Whittlesea, 1993). Semantically related 
contexts produce easier conceptual processing relative to neutral contexts, an experience that people 
may interpret as evidence of familiarity. Likewise, semantically priming, repeating, or retrieving related 
information can produce illusions of frequency, familiarity, and truth—presumably due to increased 
ease of retrieval or cognitive availability (Begg et al., 1992; Jacoby et al., 1989; Kelley & Lindsay, 
1993; Ozubko & Fugelsang, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Whittlesea, 2011). People draw on the 
characteristics of a mental event when deciding its accuracy, judging easily imagined propositions as 
more probable and evaluating the vividness and detail of imagery as a cue to reality (Johnson, 2006; 
Lindsay, 2008; Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). Photos should be particularly 
good at bootstrapping the generation of images related to a claim and thereby fostering belief in that 
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2 We use “pseudoevidence” as an umbrella term for the kinds of nonprobative, non-sensical evidence people could extract 
from the photo rather than as a process per se. That evidence could be semantic activation and an experience of conceptual 
fluency or it could be a more active process where people trawl through the photo interpreting details in the photo as evi-
dence the claim is true. 
claim.
Second, nonprobative photos might promote truthiness because people may "trawl" through the 
photo, deliberatively interpreting information they find as support for a default bias to see the claim as 
true. Such a process might be described as a confirmation bias (Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993; 
Nickerson, 1998). For instance, someone might examine the photo of a thermometer and think, “I can 
see a liquid metal inside, and I think magnesium is a metal.” By supporting selective searches for 
hypothesis-consistent evidence, photos might produce a feeling of knowing the correct answer and 
steer people away from spending extra effort considering reasons why the claim might be false (see 
Hart, 1965; Thomas, Bulevich, & Dobois, 2012). 
 Both the conceptual fluency and trawling/confirmation bias mechanisms (which are not mutually 
exclusive) hinge on the relationship between the photo and the claim, and fit with our earlier findings 
that semantically related photos can increase truthiness (Newman et al., 2012). But consider now the 
right panel of Figure 1. There is, of course, no obvious semantic relationship between a thermometer 
and a lizard. What might be the effect of such a discordant pairing on your answer? This is the question 
we address in the eight experiments we present here, as part of our ongoing exploration of the 
mechanisms underlying the effects of photos on truth judgments.
 There are reasons to predict that relative to related photos, unrelated photos will cause 
conceptual disfluency. That is, unrelated photos should make it more difficult for people to recall 
related thoughts and images. Consistent with that idea, Lee and Labroo (2004) reported that when 
people saw a target word that was semantically unrelated to a preceding sentence (“The librarian 
reached for the top shelf and pulled down a book; napkin”), they rated that target word as less pleasant 
than when they saw a target that was semantically related (“read”).  The semantically related sentence 
might help subjects more quickly identify and comprehend the subsequent target word, and/or the 
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semantically unrelated sentence might have prepared subjects for a meaning that mismatched the target 
and thereby slowed processing.   Thus it could be that the semantically unrelated words were relatively 
disfluent compared to their semantically related counterparts, an experience that people interpreted as a 
signal that the semantically unrelated words were relatively less pleasant.
Parallel effects can occur with perceptual fluency and manipulations such as degraded images, 
difficult fonts, and low contrast colors that require people to invest more cognitive effort to make sense 
of stimuli, which in turn can bias people toward evaluating these stimuli more negatively (Diemand-
Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughan, 2011; Hernandez & Preston, 2013; Petrova & Cialdini, 2005; 
Reber & Schwarz, 1999; see Yue, Castel, & Bjork, 2013). In the context of a truth judgment, additional 
cognitive effort might be taken as a signal that the information being evaluated is false. Considered 
together research on conceptual and perceptual fluency suggests that, if unrelated photos lead to 
disfluent processing relative to related photos, then they should produce “falsiness.” That is, 
nonprobative, unrelated information should bias people toward disbelieving a claim. 
 The fluency literature also tells us that the effect of photos should depend not only on the 
semantic relationship between the photo and the claim, but also the experimental context in which they 
appear. That is, truthiness or falsiness may come about because the photos make the claims feel 
relatively easy (or difficult) to process compared to the no photo items. Put simply, the effect of photos 
may depend on the comparison of processing the no photo items in the experiment.  Indeed research 
suggests that a feeling of easy retrieval or easy imagery is driven by a comparison against a standard 
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). When it is easier than expected to retrieve 
something, people interpret that processing discrepancy as a cue to truth; conversely, when it is more 
difficult than expected to retrieve something, people interpret this discrepancy the opposite way. But 
when processing matches expectations, there is no discrepancy to interpret. In other words, the no 
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photo items may produce a discrepancy in processing, making the claims with photos easier (for related 
photos) or more difficult (for unrelated photos) to process than expected. Moreover, processing 
standards do not have to arise from sustained prior experiences; experimental manipulations can forge 
them in the moment (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 2001b). 
For example, repetition is thought to produce truth because repeated statements are more easily 
processed, and people interpret this processing fluency as a sign that statements are true (Bacon, 1979; 
Begg et al., 1992; Bernstein, 2005; Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; 
Unkelbach, 2006). But as is the case with some of psychological science’s well-known effects—such as 
the mere-exposure effect—the effect of repetition on truth disappears when repetition is manipulated 
between-subjects (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2009; Roediger, 2008). In the experiments 
reported here, we examine the possibility that no photo items serve as a benchmark for processing by 
manipulating the presence of photos within and between-subjects. If the effect of photos depends on a 
comparison against a (no photo) standard, we should expect to see the most pronounced effects of 
photos in our within-subject designs.
  But there are also reasons to predict that unrelated photos would not produce falsiness in any of 
our experimental designs. As we suggested earlier, when people are making a true/false decision they 
might trawl through and selectively interpret information from a related photo as evidence that the 
claim is true. It seems unlikely that people would engage in this deliberate “trawling” strategy with 
unrelated photos. It makes little sense to search a photo of a lizard for evidence about magnesium’s 
putative role in thermometers. Moreover, we know from research on confirmation bias that if people 
encounter information inconsistent with the hypothesis at hand, they often ignore it, allocate less 
weight to that evidence, or even distort it to fit with their hypothesis (Darley & Gross, 1983; Kuhn, 
1989; Snyder & Cantor, 1979; see Nickerson, 1998, for a review; see also Fischhoff, 1975).  Some 
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research indicates that adding related nonprobative information can sway people’s judgments about 
others, but that adding unrelated information produces the same effect as giving people no information 
at all (Gill, Swann, & Silvera, 1998). Thus, a trawling mechanism would predict that unrelated photos 
would have little if any effect on people’s decisions.
We examined the effects of semantically related and unrelated photos in eight experiments. In 
each, we showed people a series of trivia claims that appeared with or without a photo that was or was 
not semantically related to the claim.
Experiments 1-3
 In Experiments 1-3 we examine the effects of semantically unrelated photos on judgments of 
truth in a fully within-subjects design. If the effects of photos depend on an expected standard of 
processing, then they should have a particularly potent effect when people experience related and 
unrelated photos within the same experimental context.
Method
Subjects. In Experiment 1-3, we used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com/
mturk) to recruit subjects in the US. MTurk is an online subject pool, in which “workers” complete 
experiments and surveys and receive small amounts of Amazon credit (they received $0.60 for this 
experiment) that they can use to purchase things on amazon.com.  Studies run online using MTurk 
attract diverse subjects and tend to produce similar results to those run in a laboratory (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Germine, Nakayama, Duchaine, Chabris, Chatterjee, & Wilmer, 2012; 
Mason & Suri, 2011; see also Lindsay, Allen, Chan, & Dahl, 2004). We predetermined a sample size of 
200 subjects based on pilot testing. Because of a quirk in the way MTurk assigns subjects, there were 
208 subjects in Experiment 1, 204 in Experiment 1, and 216 in Experiment 3.  
Design. For Experiments 1-3, we used a single-factor (photo: related, unrelated, no photo) -
TRUTHINESS AND FALSINESS! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 8
within-subjects design (a table summarizing all of our experimental designs appears in supplementary 
materials).  
Procedure. We used trivia claims from previous research to assemble sets of difficult true/false 
trivia claims sampling general knowledge (Newman et al., 2012; see also Nelson & Narens, 1980; 
Unkelbach, 2007). People typically answer these critical claims correctly 40-60% of the time. 
We used Qualtrics software to present 40 trivia claims to subjects. We told subjects that 
sometimes they would see a photo with these claims, and sometimes they would not. We did not 
provide any instructions about how they should use the photo. We asked subjects to decide the truth of 
the claim “...as quickly as possible, but not so quickly that you start making errors.” 
The claims appeared individually, in large black font against a white background. In Experiments 
1 and 2, to orient people to the task, for the first 16 trials they saw easy trivia claims (which tend to be 
answered correctly 80-100% of the time; for example, “The player who guards the net in soccer is 
called the goalie”). Half these easy claims appeared with a photograph, half with no photograph. To 
ensure the practice phase did not teach subjects a rule about the relationship between truth and the 
presence of photos, we paired photos equally often with true and false claims. Experiments 1 through 3 
differed only in terms of this set of 16 practice items seamlessly preceding the critical items:  In 
Experiment 1, a random half of the practice items appeared with a related photo and the remainder 
appeared with no photo; in Experiment 2, a random half of the 16 practice items appeared with an 
unrelated photo and the remainder appeared with no photo; in Experiment 3 there were no practice 
items.  To anticipate, the pattern of means for the critical items was the same in all three experiments. 
Immediately after these easy practice trivia claims, the experimental phase began. Subjects saw 
24 difficult trivia claims, half true and half false. For one third of trials, a related nonprobative photo 
depicted the grammatical subject of the claim. A few examples will convey the flavor of this phase: 
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“Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches” sometimes appeared with a photo of 
macadamia nuts; “Cactuses can reproduce by parthenogenesis” with a photo of a cactus, and “The 
plastic things on the ends of shoelaces are called aglets” with a photo of a shoe with a shoelace. For 
another third of trials, a semantically unrelated nonprobative photo appeared with the claim:  The claim 
about macadamia nuts sometimes appeared with a photo of a trash can; the claim about cactuses with a 
photo of a bicycle, and the claim about shoelaces with a photo of a pig. For the other third of the trials, 
people saw trivia claims presented without a photo. We used the set of related nonprobative photos 
from Newman et al. (2012) and created a new set of semantically unrelated nonprobative photos for the 
experiments reported here. A semantically unrelated photo was selected for each trivia claim. As a set, 
the unrelated photos represented a similar range of living and non-living objects as the original set of 
related photos from Newman et al. None of the photos revealed the accuracy of the trivia claims. We 
randomized the order of claims for each subject, and counterbalanced so that claims appeared equally 
often with a related photo, unrelated photo, or no photo. We used an online script to assign subjects to 
conditions randomly.
Results and Discussion
Our primary aim was to examine the effects of semantic relatedness on truthiness and falsiness. 
To address this question we calculated people’s bias (C) to say a claim was true (Stanislaw & Todorov, 
1999).3 As the left panel of Figure 2 shows, pairing a claim with a related nonprobative photo produced 
truthiness (as shown by the negative value of C in Experiment 1). But unrelated photos did not produce 
falsiness; instead, trials with unrelated photos behaved more like trials with no photos. 
Consistent with the pattern displayed in the figure, a one-way ANOVA of C showed a main effect 
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3 We corrected floor and ceiling responses by converting values of 1 to .99 and values of 0 to .01 (Wickens, 2002). Note that 
for all experiments, when we ran parallel analyses using the total proportion of true responses for each condition we found 
the same pattern of results (see Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Wickens, 2002). 
for photo F(2, 206) = 4.10, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. Follow-up tests showed that related photos produced 
more bias to say true than unrelated photos or no photos , trelated-unrelated (207) = 2.30, p = .02, Cohen’s d 
= .16, trelated-no photo(207) = 2.77, p = .01, d = .20.  In contrast, unrelated photos did not differ from no 
photos, tunrelated-no photo (207) = 0.47, p = .64, d = .04. We found no consistent effects for photographs on 
d’ but we report d’ analyses for each experiment in supplemental materials. 
  On the one hand, it is surprising that unrelated photos did not produce falsiness given that they 
should have felt especially difficult to process compared to the related photos. On the other hand, a 
critic might argue that unrelated photos failed to produce falsiness because the combination of the 
practice task (comprised of related and no photos) and experiment proper meant that unrelated photos 
occurred rarely. That is, 16 practice items appeared with a related photo or no photo, followed by a 
random series of 24 trivia claims in the experiment proper of 8 related, 8 unrelated, and 8 no photo. 
Therefore, people saw trivia claims with no photos 40% of the time; trivia claims with related photos 
40% of the time, and trivia claims with unrelated photos only 20% of the time—in other words, when a 
photo appeared with a claim, two-thirds of the time it related to the claim and one-third of the time it 
did not. Such a mix might have led subjects to “oversee” relationships between some unrelated photos 
and their associated claims, diluting the intended effect of the unrelated condition. To address this issue, 
in Experiment 2 we reran Experiment 1 except that the 16 practice items appeared with an unrelated 
photo or no photo and in Experiment 3 we ran another version of Experiment 1 in which there was no 
practice task.  
Did the practice phase bear on the effects we observed in Experiment 1? The answer is no.  
Regardless of whether people saw unrelated photos during the practice phase, or even when there was 
no practice phase, Table 1 shows that we replicated the primary findings in Experiment 1: that is, 
related photos produced truthiness, and unrelated photos acted just like no photo trials.
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A one-way ANOVA of C showed a main effect for photo (Experiment 2 F(2, 202) = 4.29, p =.02, 
ηp2 =.04; Experiment 3 F(2, 214) = 4.25, p =.02, ηp2 =.04). Related photos produced more bias to say 
true than unrelated photos or no photos (Experiment 2 t related-unrelated(203) = 2.18, p = .03, d = .15; trelated-
no photo(203) = 2.78, p = .01, d = .20; Experiment 3 trelated-unrelated(215) = 2.85, p < .01, d =.19; trelated-no 
photo(215) = 1.90, p = .06, d = .13 ), bias for unrelated did not differ from bias for no photos (Experiment 
2,  tunrelated-no photo (203) = .77, p = .44 d = .06; Experiment 3 tunrelated-no photo(215) = 1.03, p = .30, d = .06).  
In addition to these analyses we used data across Experiments 1-3 to arrive at a more precise 
estimate of the size of both the truthiness and falsiness effects by subjecting them to random effects 
model mini meta-analyses (Cumming, 2012). Those data appear in Figure 3. In the first analysis we 
focused on truthiness, comparing the related photo and no photo conditions to calculate an estimated 
raw effect size of 0.16, 95% CI [0.09, 0.23], z = 4.27, p < .01. We ran a parallel analysis focusing on 
falsiness, this time comparing unrelated photo and no photo conditions, to calculate an estimated raw 
effect size of 0.00, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.08], z = .13, p = .90, a range of values that plausibly include 
falsiness (negative values), truthiness (positive values), or zero. 
Experiment 4
In Experiments 1-3 (and in our prior work on truthiness) subjects judged trivia claims as true or 
false. The primary aim of Experiment 4 was to replicate the pattern in 1-3 using a procedure in which 
subjects rated each trivia claim on a scale from 1 (definitely false) to 9 (definitely true). In Experiment 
4, we also examined generalizability by using a new set of trivia claims—all of which were false—and 
on a sample of students at a UK university who participated in one-on-one lab sessions. Finally, in 
Experiment 4 we also added a response latency measure, which allowed us to examine the possibility 
that people were simply ignoring the unrelated photos.
Method
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Subjects. Sixty-five University of Surrey undergraduates participated in exchange for course 
credit.
Design. The design was identical to Experiment 1-3.  
Procedure. We developed a new set of 87 difficult claims (with mean ratings that fell between 
3-5 on a 7 point scale: 1 (definitely false) to 7 (definitely true), range = 3.13 to 4.96 and M = 3.91; SD = 
0.48). All the claims were false. We used E-Prime software to present the 87 claims to subjects, tested 
individually in the lab for course credit. One third of the claims appeared with an accompanying related 
photo, one third with an unrelated photo, and one third with no photo. We did not provide any 
instructions about how subjects should use the photos, but simply asked them to be as quick and as 
accurate as possible. Unlike our previous experiment in which we asked for binary true/false 
judgments, this time we asked participants to rate their confidence in the truth of each statement, using 
a scale from 1 (definitely false) to 9 (definitely true). Subjects entered their responses using the 
computer keyboard and we measured subjects’ response latency for each claim.
Results and Discussion
 Although we changed the response measure and the trivia claims, we replicated the results from 
Experiment 1-3: Pairing a claim with a related nonprobative photo produced truthiness, but unrelated 
photos behaved more like trials with no photos. There was a significant effect of photo on subjects’ 
confidence ratings, F(2, 63) = 4.88, p = .01, ηp2 = .13.  Related photos (M = 5.25, SD = .66) produced 
greater confidence ratings than did unrelated photos (M = 5.11, SD = .73) or no photos (M = 5.06, SD 
= .68), trelated-unrelated (64) = 2.24, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .28, trelated-no photo(64) = 3.00, p < .01, d = .37, 
whereas confidence for unrelated and no photos was similar tunrelated-no photo (64) = 0.88, p = .38, d = .11. 
We next coded subjects’ responses as “true” whenever their confidence ratings were 6 or above (i.e., 
greater than the scale’s midpoint), and we calculated the proportion of statements rated as true. This 
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analysis revealed the same main effect of photo, F(2, 63) = 7.39, p < .01, ηp2 = .19; trelated-unrelated (64) = 
3.57, p < .01, d = .44, trelated-no photo(64) = 3.14, p < .01, d = .39, tunrelated-no photo (64) = 0.23, p = .82, d = .03. 
That related photos produced truthiness replicates our prior findings and shows that non-
probative photos that are related to trivia claims can foster belief in those claims, true or false.  But why 
did unrelated photos have no effect relative to no photos? One possibility is that people adopted a 
strategy of ignoring unrelated photos, much as people in a Stroop task can adopt a strategy of ignoring 
the word and focusing on the color (Kane & Engle, 2003; Stroop, 1935; see also Besner, Stolz, & 
Boutilier, 1997). But there are reasons to doubt that possibility.   For one thing, subjects must have 
processed unrelated photos to some extent to determine that they were unrelated.  For another, in 
Experiment 4 we measured response latency and observed that responses were approximately 300 ms 
slower when there was a photo (related or unrelated) than when there was no photo, which suggests 
that subjects did not ignore the unrelated photos.4 Another explanation is that presenting unrelated 
photos mixed with related photos led subjects to look for semantic relationships between the claims and 
the photos, for both types of photo. For instance, they might have looked at the thermometer claim 
paired with a lizard and thought, “Well, the lizard is long and thin, like a thermometer, and has a stripe 
up the center just like a thermometer.” Such a strategy might have mitigated the perceived incongruity 
between the photos and trivia claims, leading unrelated photos to become more like related photos and 
thus diluting their falsiness. This idea fits with research showing that people will find or create meaning 
(Bartlett, 1932), especially when they are faced with pairings that do not have an obvious semantic 
relationship (for instance, novel metaphors; Grimshaw, Stewart, & Lauwereyns, 2011; Lynott & 
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4 Subjects took longer to respond to claims presented with photos than to those without photos, whereas response times for 
claims with related and unrelated photos were similar  (Mdnrelated photo = 6899.28ms, Mdnunrelated photo = 6979.28ms, Mdn 
no photo = 6604.97ms; Friedman’s χ2 = 7.02, p = .03), Wilcoxon’s Zrelated-unrelated = 1.61, p = .11; Zrelated-no photo = 2.51, p = .01; 
Zunrelated-no photo = 2.89, p < .01.
Connell, 2010; see also Foster & Kokko, 2009). 
Taken together, the findings from Experiments 1-4 suggest that in the context of related photos, 
unrelated photos exert the same influence as no photos. But part of this context likely includes 
subjects’ expectations that each photo will be meaningfully related to a claim. Might that expectation 
modulate the effect of unrelated photos? If we manipulated the semantic relatedness of photos between 
subjects, those shown unrelated photos should come to have minimal expectations about meaningful 
relationships between photos and claims. What then should be the effect of unrelated photos relative to 
no photos? One possibility is that unrelated photos would make it more difficult for people to bring to 
mind related ideas, producing disfluent conceptual processing. If so, then we should see increased 
falsiness relative to no-photo items among subjects for whom photos were always unrelated. A second 
possibility is that setting people up to expect incongruity between photos and claims might lead them to 
ignore all of the photos—a strategy that should be much easier to apply when all the photos are 
unrelated (Kane & Engle, 2003). We addressed these questions in Experiments 5 and 6 (the latter was 
an exact replication of the former).
Experiments 5 and 6
Method
Subjects. We used MTurk to recruit 196 subjects (Experiment 5) and 185 subjects (Experiment 
6) in the US. They received $0.60 Amazon credit for participating. 
Design. We used a 2 (photo: yes, no) x 2 (relatedness: related, unrelated) mixed design, 
manipulating the presence of a photo within subjects and relatedness of the photo between subjects.
Procedure. We used the same procedure as Experiment 1 with the following changes. 
Immediately after seeing the easy practice trivia claims, people saw 32 difficult trivia claims (half true, 
half false). Half of the claims appeared with a photo; for half of the subjects the photo was always 
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related to the claim whereas for the remaining subjects it was always unrelated to the claim. 
Results
 As the middle panel of Figure 2 shows, related photos again produced truthiness. But the Figure 
also shows that, in contrast to Experiments 1-3, unrelated photos produced falsiness.
A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA showed the pertinent Photo x Relatedness interaction, F(1, 194) = 9.01, p 
< .01 ηp2 = .04; related photos produced truthiness, trelated-no photo(93) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .23, but 
unrelated photos produced falsiness, tunrelated-no photo (101) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .19. As Table 1 shows, 
these patterns replicated in Experiment 6; there was a Photo x Relatedness interaction, F(1, 183) = 
18.22, p < .01 ηp2 = .09; related photos produced truthiness, trelated-no photo(83) = 4.08, p < .01, d = .44, but 
unrelated photos produced falsiness, tunrelated-no photo (100) = 1.94, p = .06, d = .19.
As in Experiments 1-3, we used data from both the primary experiment and replication to 
calculate a more precise estimate of the size of both the truthiness and falsiness effects by subjecting 
these data to random effects model mini meta-analyses (see Figure 3; Cumming, 2012). The estimated 
raw effect size for truthiness was 0.17, 95% CI [0.10, 0.25], z = 4.45, p < .01 and for falsiness it was 
-0.10, 95% CI [-0.16, -0.03], z = 2.87, p < .01.
Discussion
 We found that when the semantic relatedness of photos to claims was manipulated between 
subjects, unrelated photos produced falsiness—a pattern that fits with a fluency account, suggesting 
that the unrelated photos may have produced an experience of disfluent processing. Taken together, 
Experiments 1-4 and 5-6 might lead us to conclude that although the effects of unrelated photos depend 
on the experimental context in which they appear, related photos produce truthiness regardless of 
context. But in both of these experiments (and in Newman et al., 2012), claims with related photos 
always appeared among claims without photos; the same is true of claims with unrelated photos. Thus 
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we cannot rule out the possibility that truthiness also depends on context. That is, perhaps what drives 
truthiness is that people evaluate their processing experiences with photos against a benchmark of their 
experiences without photos (e.g. Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2009;  Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 
Roediger, 2008; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013).  If truthiness (and falsiness) depends on a standard, 
we should see that the pattern from Experiments 5 and 6 disappears when people have no standard 
against which to interpret the ease or difficulty of processing that accompanies claims paired with 
photos. Accordingly, in Experiments 7 and 8 (8 was an exact replication of 7) we manipulated the 
photo factor entirely between subjects.  
Experiment 7 and 8
Method
Subjects. We used MTurk to recruit 301 subjects (Experiment 7) and 301 subjects (Experiment 
8) in the US. They received a $0.60 Amazon credit. 
Design. We used a single-factor (photo: related, unrelated, no photo) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. Subjects saw the same trivia claims as in Experiments 5-6: 16 practice claims 
followed by 32 trivia claims. The key difference in Experiments 7-8 is that we manipulated the photo 
factor between subjects. That is, a third of subjects saw the claims paired with related photos, a third 
saw the claims paired with unrelated photos, and a final third saw the claims paired with no photo. We 
gave subjects the same instructions as in the prior experiments except that we removed any reference to 
the presence or absence of photos. 
Results and Discussion
 As the right side of Figure 2 shows, compared to when there was no photo, related photos did not 
produce truthiness and unrelated photos did not produce falsiness. In other words, there was no effect 
of photo, F(2, 298) = 0.75, p = .47, ηp2 = .01. As Table 1 shows, these patterns replicated in Experiment 
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8 F(2, 298) = 1.02, p = .36, ηp2 = .01. Together these findings fit with the idea that truthiness and 
falsiness depend on expectations acquired in the experimental context, and occur only when there is a 
discrepancy in the expected ease of processing (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998).  
 As in our earlier experiments, we used both sets of data to calculate a more precise estimate of 
the size of both the truthiness and falsiness effects by subjecting them to random effects model mini 
meta-analyses (see Figure 3, Cumming, 2012).  The estimated raw effect size for truthiness was -0.02, 
95% CI [-0.11, 0.07], z = .48, p = .63. The estimated raw effect size for falsiness was -0.06, 95% CI 
[-0.14, 0.02], z = 1.44, p = .15. These analyses show that the effects of photos on truthiness or falsiness 
are non-existent or trivial in the context of a between-subjects design.
 General Discussion
 Across eight experiments, we found that the effects of nonprobative photos on the perceived 
truth of trivia statements vary with experimental context. We also found that the effects of nonprobative 
photos depend on the semantic relationship between the photo and the claim. When trivia statements 
were accompanied by a mix of related, unrelated, and no photos, related photos produced truthiness 
relative to no photos but unrelated photos had no effect relative to no photos. When people had a no-
photo standard against which to evaluate either related or unrelated photos (Experiments 5-6), related 
photos increased the truth of claims (truthiness), and unrelated photos decreased the truth of claims 
(falsiness). But when we removed people’s ability to compare against a standard, employing a fully 
between-subjects design, neither related nor unrelated nonprobative photos influenced true/false 
judgments.  Considered as a whole, this pattern of results suggests that photos influence people’s 
judgments when a discrepancy arises in the expected ease of processing—that is, when subjects find 
claims with photos easier (or more difficult) to evaluate compared to claims without photos (Hansen, 
Dechêne, & Wänke, 2008; Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 2001b).  
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Of course, one might argue that these effects of photos are produced by some kind of demand 
characteristic. But there are at least three reasons why we don’t think that is the case. First, we told 
subjects that the study was about visual and verbal learning, so subjects did not know the purpose of 
the study. Second, if subjects did figure out our hypothesis, we wouldn’t necessarily expect them to act 
in a way that would promote the effect. In fact, the literature on fluency shows that when people detect 
the source of fluent processing (or they can “see through” the manipulation), they tend to discount that 
fluency experience and try to counteract any influence that source of fluency might have on their 
judgements (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Oppenheimer, 2004). In other words, this literature 
suggests that if subjects had some inkling of the idea that photos could influence their decisions, we 
would expect them to say “false” more when they saw a related photo paired with a claim. But we see 
the opposite pattern of results. Third, if demand characteristics were driving truthiness, then photos 
should have a systematic effect not just across studies but across all of our items. In our earlier work, 
we found instead that photos produced truthiness for unfamiliar claims—that is, in conditions of 
uncertainty, which are conditions that also make people susceptible to fluency effects (see Newman et 
al., 2012; Schwarz, 2010; Unkelbach, 2007). 
Rather, these findings support a mechanism in which—against a backdrop of an expected 
standard—related photos help people generate pseudoevidence to support the claim. Related photos 
might help people generate pseudoevidence by facilitating conceptual processing, perhaps increasing 
cognitive availability and (or) helping people trawl for evidence (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Nickerson, 
1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Whittlesea, 2011). Our anecdotal observations of a small number of 
lab-tested pilot subjects (who provided think-aloud protocols while performing the procedure of 
Experiments 5-6) also fit with such a mechanism. For instance, when faced with the claim “Macadamia 
nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches” paired with a photo of macadamia nuts, one 
TRUTHINESS AND FALSINESS! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 19
subject said, “I’m going to go with yes because they kind of look like peaches, so that would make 
sense.”
The finding that unrelated photos produced falsiness in Experiments 5 and 6 fits with the idea 
that unrelated photos should not help people generate confirming pseudoevidence, and may actually 
generate a feeling of incongruity or difficult processing when evaluating the claim. Nonetheless, it is 
puzzling that unrelated photos did not produce falsiness in Experiments 1-4; instead, subjects seemed 
to treat them as no photo items. One reason why unrelated photos did not produce falsiness is that 
presenting them along with related photos led subjects to look for semantic relationships between the 
claims and the unrelated photos. This kind of process might dilute the perceived incongruity between 
the unrelated photos and trivia claims, leading unrelated photos to become more like related photos and 
thus reducing their falsiness. Indeed, people have a tendency to find meaning (Bartlett, 1932), 
especially when they are faced with pairings that do not have an obvious semantic relationship (for 
instance, novel metaphors; Grimshaw, Stewart, & Lauwereyns, 2011; Lynott & Connell, 2010; see also 
Foster & Kokko, 2009). We think this is an intriguing result worthy of future research. 
 Photos did not produce truthiness or falsiness in Experiments 7 and 8.  That finding is consistent 
with research on discrepant fluency, where conceptually fluent items have the most pronounced effects 
when they are presented against a backdrop of relatively disfluent items (when ease of processing is 
manipulated within subjects; Hansen et al., 2008; Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 
2001b). But there are at least two other possibilities. First, there are many cues that people could draw 
on to decide whether a claim is true (e.g., credibility of the source of the claim, familiarity, logical 
coherence) and it is possible that the within-subject design produces truthiness because it emphasizes 
photos as the important cue, because their presence changes across trials (see Schwarz, in press). Such 
an emphasis is not placed on photos in the between-subjects design (the presence or absence of photos 
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is constant across trials), so people may turn to other cues they notice changing across items such as the 
familiarity of a name or the ease or difficulty of a statement (see Newman et al., 2012). An interesting 
avenue for future research might be to disentangle these accounts of the between-subjects data. 
A second and less interesting account of the between-subjects data is that people simply ignored 
the photos and that is why they had little influence on people’s judgments. But there are several reasons 
why the ignoring hypothesis is not a compelling explanation of the results of Experiment 7 and 8. For 
instance, while people might find the unrelated photos distracting, it is unclear why people would be 
motivated to ignore the related photos in the between-subjects condition. In addition, eye-tracking 
studies show that we tend to be drawn to visual information, so it would take cognitive effort and some 
kind of explicit strategy to ignore the photos (e.g., Sargent, 2007).  In fact, we should be able to detect 
if people are engaging in this kind of strategy by examining people’s responses and response times 
across trials. Although we do not have response times for Experiments 7 and 8, we did collect RTs 
when we ran a between-subjects replication of some of our earlier photo research (We conducted a 
conceptual replication of Experiment 1 from Newman et al., 2012, manipulating the presence of photos 
between-subjects). If the ignoring hypothesis is true, we should have seen a difference in people’s 
responses and RTs across trials. That is, people should initially show a photo effect, or spend more time 
on photo trials, an effect that should fade across trials as people refine their ignoring strategy. In 
contrast to the ignoring hypothesis, we found that if we compare the photo and no photo trials, there 
were no differences in people’s response times for the first quarter block and the last quarter block. In 
fact, in both blocks and across all trials, people took slightly longer to respond to photo trials (a pattern 
consistent with our within-subject data in Experiment 4). That is, people started the same way they 
ended—they did not learn to ignore across trials. Moreover, there was no evidence that photos caused 
diminishing truthiness over trials. Both of these findings are at odds with the proposal that people 
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learned to use some kind of ignoring strategy in the between-subjects design. 
 In all of our analyses we examined the effect of photos relative to the no photo condition. So 
what we have demonstrated is that the difference in response bias between photo and no photo 
conditions varied across experimental contexts. But we could also ask how response bias in each 
condition—the absolute bias for related, unrelated and no photo trials—varied across experimental 
contexts. This question gains piquancy from the fact that the response bias to no-photo items (which 
served as our baseline control condition) varied across conditions (see Figure 4 for a forest plot of 
estimates of C against the benchmark of zero).   
Lindsay and Kantner (2011) observed that old/new recognition memory response bias tends to be 
conservative when the stimuli are scans of paintings. Subsequent work (Lindsay, Kantner, & Fallow, in 
press) found that when the stimuli include a mix of paintings and words, bias was conservative on 
paintings and liberal on words. But in a between-subjects design, although bias continued to be 
conservative on paintings it was neutral on words. It may be that the liberal recognition bias on words 
in the mixed case was an artifact of subjects’ reluctance to classify paintings as old; that is, subjects 
were reluctant to claim that paintings were old, but they also did not want to say “No” to too many 
probes so they compensated by being liberal on words. We find a similar pattern in the data here: when 
claims were a mix of related, unrelated, and no photos, bias was neutral for claims presented with an 
unrelated photo or with no photo and liberal for claims presented with related photos. But in a between-
subjects design, bias was neutral for all conditions. Taken together, these findings show that absolute 
response bias varies according to attributes of the stimuli, as well as the context in which those stimuli 
appear. 
Taken together with our prior work, the eight experiments reported here suggest that 
nonprobative photographs do more than simply decorate claims: they wield a significant and immediate 
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influence on people’s judgments. As with many effects in the cognitive psychology literature, our 
photo-truthiness and falsiness effects depend on the way in which people process and interpret photos 
when evaluating the truth of claims. 
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Example of related and unrelated photos and associated trivia claims. Thermometer photo 
courtesy of Andres Rueda, Skink photo courtesy of William Cho, Creative Commons licenses.
Figure 2. Bias for trivia claims presented with or without a photograph that was semantically related or 
unrelated to the trivia claims. A negative value of c is a bias to say true.  Error bars show 95% within-
subject confidence intervals (see Masson & Loftus, 2003) for the photo/no-photo effect for Experiment 
1 (within-subjects design) and 5 (mixed design) and the 95% between-subjects confidence intervals for 
each cell mean in Experiments 7 (between-subjects design)  
Figure 3. Forest plot of effect sizes for related and unrelated photos between studies (Derzon & Alford, 
2013). Each row represents one experiment, starting with the original experiment and then subsequent 
replications. The top panel of the plot displays the effects for related photos. The bottom panel of the 
plot displays the effects for unrelated photos. The location of each shape on the horizontal axis 
represents the raw effect size—the difference between people’s response bias when they saw claims 
paired with a (related/unrelated) photo compared to when they saw claims without photos. The lines 
extending either side of a shape represent a 95% confidence interval (note that a 95% CI for a mean 
difference that excludes zero will be significantly different from zero using null hypothesis testing).  
The black shape shows the result of the meta-analysis for each experiment, with the center of the shape 
indicating the estimated effect size, and again the black lines extending either side of a shape represent 
a 95% confidence interval. Finally, within each panel on the plot, data that fall to the right of the zero 
line show truthiness (nonprobative related photos lead people to believe a claim) and data that fall to 
the left side of the zero line show falsiness (nonprobative unrelated photos lead people to disbelieve a 
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claim).  Tables presenting additional results from the meta-analyses can be found in supplementary 
materials. 
Figure 4. Forest plot of mean bias (c) scores (an estimate from a meta-analysis for each experiment) for 
related photo, unrelated photo and no photo conditions, plotted for each experimental design. Tables 
presenting additional results from the meta-analyses can be found in supplementary materials.
TRUTHINESS AND FALSINESS! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 33
Running Head: TRUTHINESS AND FALSINESS!! ! ! ! ! ! ! !      "1!
!!!!! !
!!!!!
























Experiment 1      
       
Experiment 2: Practice 
phase with unrelated photos
-.13 (.76) .00 (.71) .06 (.81)
!
Experiment 3: With no 
practice phase




Related  Condition -.16 (.45) * .04 (.46)
Unrelated Condition * -.02  (.39) -.11 (.42)
Experiment 7
 
Experiment 8  .00 (.43) .01 (.42) -.06 (.33)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Negative bias (C) values show a 
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Table 1.  




d’       Statistical 
Analyses
Experiment 1    
     
Related Photos .22 (1.44) A one way repeated measures ANOVA showed no 
main effect for photo F(2, 206) = .36, p = .70, ηp2 
=.003.
Unrelated Photos .15 (1.19)
No Photos .26 (1.40)
Experiment 5    
 
Related Condition
A 2(photo: photo vs. no photo) x 2(relatedness: 
related vs. unrelated) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the first factor showed no main effect 
for relatedness, F(1, 194) = 2.16, p =.14, ηp2 = .01; 
no main effect for photos, F(1, 194) = .55, p =.46, 
ηp2 = .003. and no Photo x Relatedness 
interaction, F(1, 194) = 2.03, p =.16, ηp2 = .01.
Related Photos .34 (0.74)
No Photos .18 (0.70)
Unrelated Condition
Unrelated Photos .34 (0.72)
No Photos .39 (0.65) 
Experiment 7
 
Related Photos .24 (0.44) A one way ANOVA showed no effect for photo, 
F(2, 298) = .1.71, p =.18, ηp2 =.01.
Unrelated Photos .28 (0.47)
No Photos .36 (0.53)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Higher sensitivity (d’) values 
indicate better discrimination ability.
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Experiment 1        
         
Replication 1: Practice phase 
with unrelated photos
.16 (1.30) .28 (1.33) .08 (1.37) A one way repeated measures 
ANOVA showed no main effect for 
photo F(2, 202) = 1.19, p = .31, ηp2 
=.01.
Replication 2: With no 
practice phase
.18 (1.30) .12 (1.29) .22 (1.26) A one way repeated measures 
ANOVA showed no main effect for 





A 2(photo: photo vs. no photo) x 
2(relatedness: related vs. unrelated) 
mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the first factor showed 
a Photo x Relatedness interaction, 
F(1, 183) = 5.95, p = .02, ηp2 =.03; 
regardless of condition, when 
people saw a photograph paired 
with a statement their discrimination 
was similar, t related photo-
unrelated photo(83) = .45, p = .65, 
but when people evaluated claims 
without photos, those people in the 
unrelated condition had better 
discrimination than people in the 
related photo conditions, t unrelated 
no photo-related no photo (183) = 
3.73, p < .01.
Replication 
Related  Condition .25 (0.75) * .10 (0.66)
Unrelated Condition * .30 (0.67) .47 (0.70)
Experiment 7
A one-way ANOVA showed no 
significant effect for evidence, F(2, 
298) = .2.55, p = .08, ηp2 =.02.
 
Replication .20 (0.50) .31 (0.45) .34 (0.43)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Higher sensitivity (d’) values indicate 
better discrimination ability. Considered together with the experiments reported in 
the main text, there were no consistent effects of photos on accuracy. 
Running Head: TRUTHINESS AND FALSINESS!! ! ! ! ! ! ! !      1
Table 3. Results from meta-analyses estimating Truthiness (the difference in response 




1 0.19 0.05 0.32 2.77 0.01
2 0.19 0.06 0.32 2.78 0.01
3 0.12 -0.00 0.24 1.90 0.06
MA Experiments 1-3 0.16 0.09 0.23 4.27 0.00
5 0.13 0.01 0.24 2.12 0.03
6 0.20 0.11 0.30 4.08 0.00
MA Experiments 5 & 6 0.17 0.10 0.25 4.45 0.00
7 0.03 -0.09 0.14 0.45 0.65
8 -0.07 -0.17 0.04 -1.21 0.23
MA Experiments 7 & 8 -0.02 -0.11 0.07 -0.48 0.63
Note.  ES = effect size, calculated as the difference between related photo and no 
photo means. LL and UL are the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence 
interval of the effect size. Positive effect sizes show truthiness (nonprobative related 
photos lead people to believe a claim).
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Table 4. Results from meta-analyses estimating Falsiness (the difference in response 




1 0.03 -0.09 0.14 0.47 0.64
2 0.05 -0.08 0.18 0.77 0.44
3 -0.07 -0.19 0.06 -1.03 0.30
MA Experiments 1-3 0.00 -0.07 0.08 0.13 0.90
5 -0.10 -0.19 0.01 -2.12 0.03
5 -0.09 -0.19 0.00 -1.94 0.05
MA Experiments 5 & 6 -0.10 -0.16 -0.03 -2.87 0.00
7 -0.04 -0.16 0.07 -0.76 0.45
8 -0.07 -0.18 0.04 -1.26 0.21
MA Experiments 7 & 8 -0.06 -0.14 0.02 -1.44 0.15
Note.  ES = effect size, calculated as the difference between unrelated photo and no 
photo means. LL and UL are the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence 
interval of the effect size. Negative effect sizes show falsiness (nonprobative 
unrelated photos lead people to disbelieve a claim).
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Table 5. Mean bias (c) scores and meta-analyses comparing related photo, unrelated 




No Photo Condition 
Experiment 1 0.12 0.02 0.22 2.28 0.02
Experiment 2 0.06 -0.05 0.17 1.06 0.29
Experiment 3 -0.05 -0.14 0.04 -1.08 0.28
Result of MA Experiments 1-3 0.04 -0.06 0.14 0.77 0.44
Experiment 5/unrelated -0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.63 0.53
Experiment 6/unrelated -0.11 -0.19 -0.03 -2.63 0.01
Result of MA Experiments 5 & 6/
unrelated 
-0.07 -0.15 0.00 -1.84 0.07
Experiment 5/related 0.03 -0.08 0.14 0.56 0.58
Experiment 6/related 0.04 -0.06 0.14 0.80 0.43
Result of MA Experiment 5 & 6/related 0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.97 0.33
Experiment 7 -0.02 -0.10 0.06 -0.50 0.62
Experiment 8 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 -1.83 0.07
Result of MA Experiments  7 & 8 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 -1.73 0.08
Related Photo Condition
Experiment 1 -0.07 -0.18 0.04 -1.28 0.20
Experiment 2 -0.13 -0.23 -0.03 -2.44 0.01
Experiment 3 -0.17 -0.26 -0.08 -3.73 0.00
Result of MA Experiments 1-3 -0.13 -0.19 -0.07 -4.42 0.00
Experiment 5 -0.10 -0.20 0.00 -1.94 0.05
Experiment 6 -0.16 -0.26 -0.06 -3.26 0.00
Result of MA Experiments 5 & 6 -0.13 -0.20 -0.06 -3.70 0.00
Experiment 7 -0.04 -0.11 0.03 -1.10 0.27
Experiment 8 0.00 -0.08 0.08 0.00 1.00
Result of MA Experiments  7 & 8 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.84 0.40
Unrelated Photo Condition
Experiment 1 0.09 -0.01 0.19 1.75 0.08
Experiment 2 0.00 -0.10 0.10 0.00 1.00
Experiment 3 0.01 -0.08 0.10 0.21 0.83
Result of MA Experiments 1-3 0.03 -0.02 0.09 1.10 0.27
Experiment 5 0.06 -0.04 0.16 1.19 0.23
Experiment 6 -0.02 -0.10 0.06 -0.51 0.60
Result of MA Experiments 5 & 6 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.34 0.73
Experiment 7 0.03 -0.06 0.12 0.63 0.53
Experiment 8 0.01 -0.07 0.09 0.24 0.81
Result of MA Experiments  7 & 8 0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.60 0.55
Running Head: TRUTHINESS AND FALSINESS
Note.  M = is a point estimate of response bias (c) in each condition, for each 
experimental design. LL and UL are the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence 
interval of the effect size. Negative values of c (below zero) show a tendency to 
respond that a claim is true, and positive values (above zero) show a tendency to 
respond that a claim is false. 




Hits       FAs
Experiment 1    
     
Related Photos 0.55 (0.25) 0.49 (0.29)
Unrelated Photos 0.50 (0.25) 0.46 (0.25)
No Photos 0.51 (0.27) 0.43 (0.26)
Experiment 2
 
Related Photos 0.55 (0.25) 0.51 (0.27)
Unrelated Photos 0.54 (0.24) 0.46 (0.27)
No Photos 0.50 (0.27) 0.47 (0.27)
Experiment 3
 
Related Photos 0.58 (0.25) 0.52 (0.25)
Unrelated Photos 0.51 (0.23) 0.47 (0.26)
No Photos 0.55 (0.23) 0.48 (0.26)
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Related Photos 0.59 (0.18) 0.48 (0.20)
No Photos 0.53 (0.21) 0.46 (0.20)
Unrelated Condition
Unrelated Photos 0.54 (0.21) 0.42 (.17)




Related Photos 0.60 (0.18) 0.51 (0.20)
No Photos 0.51 (0.19) 0.47 (0.19)
Unrelated Condition
Unrelated Photos 0.56 (0.18) 0.46 (0.17)
No Photos 0.62 (0.19) 0.46 (0.18)
Running Head: TRUTHINESS AND FALSINESS




Hits       FAs
Experiment 7
 
Related Photos 0.56 (0.13) 0.47 (0.16)
Unrelated Photos 0.54 (0.16) 0.44 (0.19)
No Photos 0.57 (0.16) 0.44 (0.16)
Experiment 8
 
Related Photos 0.54 (0.16) 0.47 (0.16)
Unrelated Photos 0.56 (0.17) 0.45 (0.16)
No Photos 0.59 (0.15) 0.46 (0.13)
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